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Abstract
In managing common pool resources; ideally, it was carried out using a co-management approach 
that facilitated the cooperation, sharing of power, and responsibility among actors. However, this is 
quite difficult to achieve since each actor competes against each other’s interests. Such cooperation 
and competition between actors will form a structure of social networks. This study aims to 
explain the dynamics of the formation of social network structures based on the cooperation and 
competition among actors in the management of Lake Tempe, a common pool resource crossing 
Wajo, Soppeng and Sidenreng Rappang Regencies in South Sulawesi Province. This is a qualitative 
study with explanatory case study approach, using two data collection techniques: participatory 
observation and in-depth interview with the government, fishermen, businessmen, and NGOs. 
This study found that the formation process of the social network structure in the management of 
Lake Tempe is a dynamic interaction among actors, i.e., cooperation in one side and competition 
on the other side, forming a social networking structure in two types: centrality and heterogeneity 
network. Network centrality occurs at the level of decision-making, the rules of play, and the 
allocation of resources, which is dominated by government actors, while heterogeneity network 
is dominated by communities that are still maintaining social capital such as kinship as well 
as knowledge and resources sharing. Brokerages, those who link the advantaged groups (local 
government and big-scale-fisherman/Pallawang) with the disadvantaged (small-scale-fisherman/
Pakkajalalla) do not exist in the management. Although the existence of brokerages is potential, 
they may also have a conflict of interest, since authorities and economic factors will be their target.
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Introduction
In managing common-owned natural 
resources that comprise the decision-making 
process and the allocation of natural resources, 
it is common that the contestation of interests 
will arise between actors. Contestation, as 
argued by Margono, et al. (2013) is the process 
of interaction between actors who claim each 
other for their interests in determining the 
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management orientation of an item (specifically 
common goods) between social interests 
versus business interests, and social interests 
versus interests of authority, there is the 
struggle of each actor to represent his interests. 
Contestation of interests between actors occurs 
based on differences in knowledge, ideology, 
and expectations of each actor (Mitchell, 
2010, p. 7). The actor referred here refers 
to parties that allow interest and influence, 
individuals, groups and organizations (such as 
government, private sector, non-governmental 
organizations, land users, and landowners) in 
a natural resource area. When the contestation 
of interests between actors is not well managed, 
it is feared that it will lead to a natural inability 
to fulfill various actors’ requests (over carrying 
capacity). Hardin (1968) discusses it as the 
tragedy of the common, namely the natural 
resources tragedy because of continuous 
exploitation by various actors.
In accommodating interest contestations 
between actors, some experts promote 
collaborative management approaches based on 
social networks as a critique of the hierarchical 
and market structure approach that has existed 
in the natural resource management. Ostrom 
(1990) was a pioneer who initially criticized 
Hardin’s (1968) writing, which only suggested 
mechanisms for managing common-owned 
natural resources (centralized-governance) 
through centralized-governance mechanisms 
and market mechanisms by private ownership 
(private-enterprise).
According to Ostrom et al. (1994), 
common pool resources are types of goods that 
the availability are limited, but many parties 
want to use them. Thus, management is no 
longer handled and dominated by a single actor 
or institution, but with a joint management 
approach (Ostrom, 1990; Berkes and Folke, 2000), 
co-management is used to facilitate collaboration 
between actors (Berkes, 2009; Sandström, and 
Rova, 2010; Carlsson and Sandström, 2008), and 
formulated in terms of the division of power 
and responsibility between state actors and 
users’ local communities (Carlsson & Berkes, 
2005; Carlsson and Sandström, 2008). Dietz et 
al. (2003) prove and find the fact that through 
self-governing institutions analysis in managing 
natural resource, several community groups in 
the UK have successfully fought the threat of 
natural resource degradation in their country.
B a s e d  o n  t h e  t h e o r y  o f  s h a r e d 
management and general characteristics of 
natural resources that require cooperation, 
the distribution of power and responsibility 
among actors in management, Lake Tempe 
South Sulawesi, as one of the Mainland 
Common Water categories and common-owned 
natural resources, is ideally managed with a 
collaborative approach management based on 
social networks. However, the fact shows that 
social networks have not worked effectively 
to encourage collective action in integrating 
social, economic, and environmental interests. 
In fact, it is still dominated by the pursuit of 
economic interests of each actor to get the 
maximum economic benefits.
This can be seen from the management 
policies of 3 Regional Governments (Wajo, 
Sidrap, and Soppeng Regencies) which are 
still individually making Regional Regulations 
for the Management of Lake Tempe that is 
in their territory. Although several articles 
consider pro-environment management and 
maintain the social function of the lake, it 
still seems more dominant to be motivated 
to obtain locally generated revenue (PAD). 
Policy of The 3 Regencies Government to 
auction ex-ornament land shows the practice 
of commercialization and triggering social 
and economic polarization. At least, it can be 
seen from the relationship dynamics and ties 
that arise between auction-winning fishermen 
(Pallawang) who use harvesters and fishermen 
who use mobile fishing gear (Pakkajalalla). 
The auction winner fisherman (Pallawang) 
seeks to extract the natural resources that 
are controlled as much as possible to gain 
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profits by reason of issuing capital. While 
small fishermen (Pakkajalalla) feel increasingly 
pressured because they have increasingly 
narrow fishing areas, so they make complaints 
by using prohibited fishing gear (illegal fishing) 
and carrying out disturbances to the auction 
winner’s land for survival purposes. At the 
same time, the local government should be 
present with its authority to enforce regulations, 
but in reality, it seems helpless to control illegal 
fishing, which is increasingly prevalent.
This research focuses on the dynamics 
of the formation of social network structures 
behind the contestation of interests between 
these actors in the management of Lake Tempe. 
This research focused on the pattern and 
content of the relationships between actors 
expressed through the patterns of relations of 
interests, knowledge, and authority of each 
actor in the management of Lake Tempe. The 
theory used in this study to explain the pattern 
of relations of interests, knowledge, and power 
between actors is the theory of social networks. 
In this context, this study follows Granovetter 
(in Ritzer and Goodman, 2010) who examines 
social networks from actions of relations 
between actors that occur at the level of macro 
and micro social structures. According to him, 
through relationships between actors, form 
structured and tended to be stratified bonds, 
where one particular component depends on 
other components (interdependence), so that 
the relationship was based on the idea that each 
actor (individual or collectivity) has different 
access to valuable resources (wealth, power, 
information).
One of the basic principles of social 
networking is to enable symmetrical and 
asymmetrical relationships to occur between 
actors in social action. Symmetrical relationships 
occur when actors supply different resources 
based on their level and intensity. Asymmetric 
relationships occur when there are elements in 
a wider network system with limited resources 
distributed unevenly or lame. Uneven and 
unequal distribution of limited resources forms 
an imbalanced network structure that forces 
actors to cooperate and compete (structural 
coercion) in fighting over a natural resource. 
Some individuals and groups will join to 
get limited resources by collaborating, while 
some individuals or groups will compete for 
resources (Ritzer and Goodman, 2010)
Recent research on social networks 
in managing natural resources has largely 
explored the role of social networks, in terms 
of collaboration between actors (Bodin and 
Ernston, 2006; Bodin and Crona, 2009, Lauber, 
et al. 2008; Crona and Bodin, 2006; Prell, et 
al. 2009; Yamaki; 2014). For example, Bodin 
and Ernston (2006) have concluded that 
the existence of social networks is a general 
dominator, and it is important to facilitate 
collaboration between different actors and 
stakeholders in natural resource management. 
Meanwhile, studies of social networks are 
rarely found in terms of competition or 
asymmetric relationships between actors. For 
this reason, this paper focuses on elaborating 
the dynamics of the emergence of asymmetric 
social network structures in the management 
of Lake Tempe.
Previous studies have established two 
distinctive forms of network structures that 
affect the performance of natural resource 
management; namely, network closures and 
network heterogeneity (Yamaki, 2014, Bodin 
and Ernston, 2006, Bodin and Crona, 2009; 
Sandström & Carlsson 2008; Sandström & Rova 
2010a, 2010b). First, the closeness or network 
closure, which is evaluated by the level of 
connectedness, associated with social ties or 
solidarity between actors in clicks or groups 
(bonding). Network closure can be seen in 
two forms based on the level and intensity 
of the actor’s relationship, namely (1) density 
network, where actors are directly connected to 
each other; and (2) centralized networks, where 
most actors are directly connected with central 
actors and other actors are indirectly connected 
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through central actors.
Second, network heterogeneity is related 
to structural holes; namely, connections between 
various sub-groups that are structurally 
separate, such as in an organization or a 
certain sector directed towards bridging actors 
(individuals or groups) that have separated 
(Burt, 2001). This study explains the dynamics 
of the formation of 3 typologies of the structure 
of social networks; namely, the network of 
closeness, centralized networks and structural 
holes in the case of Lake Tempe, South Sulawesi.
Method
This research was carried out in Lake 
Tempe, South Sulawesi Province, which 
traversed three Regencies, namely Wajo 
Regency, Soppeng and Sidenreng Rappang 
covering 7 Sub Regencies and 26 villages/
region which bordered directly. Lake Tempe 
was chosen as the location of the study because 
at this location; there was a social network 
between actors in the management of Lake 
Tempe. Each actor interacts (cooperating 
and competing) representing their respective 
interests in the use of natural resources at Lake 
Tempe (Figure 1 Map of Research Locations).
This research is qualitative research with 
an explanatory case study approach following 
the opinion of Yin (2006) to answer “how” or 
“why” research questions directed to a series 
of contemporary events, where the researchers 
only have little chance or no opportunity 
to exercise control against the event. This 
study aims to answer the question “how” the 
dynamics of the formation of the social network 
structure behind the contestation of interests 
between actors in the event of natural resource 
management at Lake Tempe, South Sulawesi.
The data collection techniques in this 
study were, first, in-depth interviews with 
seven people from the Government, five big 
Figure 1.
Map of Research Locations
       Source: adopted from KLH, 2014.
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fishermen, 30 small fishermen, two traders, and 
2 NGOs. Determination of the informant was 
carried out using the snowball technique, which 
is extracting data and information to informants 
who know the context of the study through in-
depth interviews from one informant to other 
informants and so on until the researcher 
does not find new data and information 
(Hamidi, 2005, p. 75). Second, the data collection 
techniques used are observations involved in 
following Baiquni (2007) to see directly and 
deeply the social processes and social network 
structures that take place in the research area, 
so that it achieved a general description of the 
condition of the research area and actual issues 
in the community related to the theme of this 
research. Observations were carried out in an 
engaging manner, specifically to observe who 
the actors that involved in social networks 
are and how the processes and mechanisms 
for the formation of social network structures 
behind the interactions between actors in the 
management of Lake Tempe.
Result and Discussion
Dynamics of Actor Relations and Contestation 
of Interest
Lake Tempe is a lake of flood plain in 
the Walanae River and Cenranae Rivers in 
South Sulawesi. The Lake Tempe Basin consists 
of terraces and floodplains. The terrain is 
generally flat in shape, located a few meters 
from the flood plain, but the boundary between 
the two plains is not firm. During the dry season 
there are three lakes; namely, Lake Tempe, 
Lake Sidenreng and Lake Buaya, which are 
separated and only connected with naturally 
formed waterways. During the rainy season, all 
the three lakes are united into a single pool of 
lake, and by the local community are called the 
flood. The area of  Lake Tempe during the rainy 
season of March - July is approximately 28,000 
ha with water elevations from 6.0 to 7.0 m above 
the sea level and 43,000 ha at elevations from 7.0 
to 9.0 m above the sea level. In the dry season, 
it will reach water elevations at around 0, 50 - 
2, 0 m above the sea level or an average of 1.25 
m above the sea level only reaches 10,000 ha 
(KLH, 2012; KLH, 2014; KLH, 2006).
The management case of Lake Tempe 
has become an arena of contestation of 
interests between actors when there is value 
manipulation between Lake Tempe as a 
common pool resource (or shared property) 
shifting into state or private property whose 
management practices are controlled by an 
individual or group. One of the basic principles 
of common pool resource is that its resources 
are limited, but many actors or stakeholders 
are willing to claim and utilize these resources.
If a fishery land is controlled by one 
individual or a group, it will automatically 
exclude other individuals or groups to utilize the 
fishery land. At this point, emerged actors who 
dominate dominated the management practices 
of the Lake Tempe. Social networks work as a 
mechanism of relations and ties between actors 
(individuals, groups or organizations) that take 
place in the middle of actors who pursue each 
other’s desires. The dynamics of the relationships 
and ties between these actors form the structure 
of the social networks.
As is known, the management of Lake 
Tempe is very complex, full of uncertainty and 
the potential for conflict of interest. It is complex 
because it relates to one spatially integrated 
area, but is limited by the administrative 
and political boundaries of 3 Regencies 
(Wajo, Soppeng, and Sidrap) as freshwater 
fisheries cultivation areas in three Regencies 
(Maros, Enrekang and Bone) as upstream and 
downstream of the Watershed (DAS). Full of 
uncertainty is because natural resources are 
greatly affected by climate change and the 
socio-cultural conditions of the society that 
are constantly changing. Potential conflicts 
of interest occur because of the diversity of 
actors and interests that play as many have 
previously described the existence of mutual 
claims, differences in values, knowledge, and 
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degrees of power among the actors involved.
Although the management of Lake Tempe 
is very complex, decision-making was found to 
be still done individually by each Regency. This 
can be seen from the official decision of each 
by issuing a Regional Regulation or Regents of 
the Regent, namely:
1. For Wajo Regency with Regional Regulation 
No.4 of 2012 concerning Management of 
Fisheries Resources in Wajo Regency;
2. For Soppeng Regency with Regent 
Regula t ion  No.13 /Perbub/VI /2012 
concerning Procedures for Common Water 
Management and Tappareng Salae, and
3. For Sidenreng Rappang Regency with 
Regional Regulation No.4 of 2010 concerning 
Management of General Fisheries Resources 
in the Sidenreng Rappang Regency.
Based on the Regional Regulations 
document and 3 of the Regencies, it was 
found that the similarities in the basis of 
the government’s thinking in taking the 
management decisions of Lake Tempe, include 
(1) agreement on administrative boundaries 
marked by concrete stakes; (2) fishing 
procedures; (3) fishing gear requirements; and 
(4) conservation area.
At the very least, the rationale for decision-
making in managing Lake Tempe can be found 
in the narrative that currently Lake Tempe is 
over fishing; many fishing gears do not fit the 
type and their size. In accordance with the 
Regional Regulation 3 of the Regencies, the 
net is set to be above 5 cm, 7 cm and 9 cm and 
a maximum length of 500 meters, so as not 
to catch small fish. However, the fact is that 
there are those who use under 5 cm and their 
length exceeds 500 meters. In addition, there 
are also fishermen who use prohibited fishing 
gear, such as storage storm, tiger trawlers, and 
trawlers and Cantarng (Tongkang).
In addition, the Regional Regulation 
3 of the Regencies underlies the auction 
mechanism of ex-ornamental land, which is 
known locally as Pallawang belonging to 
the Regional Government with the aim of 
increasing Regional Original Revenue. In 
Soppeng Regency, there are 12 ex-ornaments and 
Tappareng Salae land points. In Wajo Regency, 
there are 27 Pallawang locations spread in 4 
Districts and Sidenreng Rappang Regency, 
there are 2 locations in Panca Lautan District.
Interestingly, because there is also a land 
owned by the Regional Government, there is 
also a private location, which, if traced, the 
owner or master (Mangongko) of these lands 
is the descendant of Datu (King) who once 
ruled the area or former District Head and 
Sub-district head who had ruled or ruled in 
the region. There are also those who are still 
controlled by the sub-district head who rules 
in a region, so he has the right to manage for 
the benefit of the government. For example, the 
Belle Barue location located in Woronge Village, 
Sabbangparu District, Wajo Regency which 
borders Soppeng Regency, which is about 100 
Ha in size. In addition, there has also been a 
changed hand to ordinary citizens because 
of the process of purchasing or mastering the 
process based on family claims (Ongko) for 
generations. The rest is free access (open access) 
by the captured fishermen (Pakkajalalla) whose 
area is wider than the government property 
and private property. Free land access can be 
transformed into private or group control when 
individuals or groups install permanent fishing 
gear, such as Bungka Toddo, which is claimed 
by one family from generation to generation.
Based on the management mechanism, 
it is found three ownership regimes; namely, 
the local government property, the private 
property, and the common property free 
access. Actually, this ownership regime is more 
appropriately referred to as Ongko as the 
name and term known by the residents in Lake 
Tempe; namely, land tenure claims by actors 
(individuals or groups) for a certain time and 
certain water depth conditions.
In Wajo Regency, the period of the tenure 
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of the auction is two years but is controlled 
only from 1st of May – 31st of December every 
year. In Soppeng Regency, the tenure in the 
auction is one year but is controlled from 1st 
of July – 31st of December, outside that period, 
the land changes to open access, meaning that 
it can be accessed by the captured fishermen 
(Pakkajalalla). In Sidenreng Rappang Regency, 
the tenure auction was two years and was 
held for two years without any lags, such as in 
Soppeng Regency and Wajo Regency.
Land tenure by the auction winner 
(Pallawang) is regulated depending on the 
conditions of certain water depths. Although, 
in the auction tenure period and within the 
stipulated time to be mastered; however, 
when the water depth in the lake is above 
1.45 meters, then the land may be accessed 
or become a fishing area that is free for the 
captured fishermen (Pakkajalalla). Exceptions 
occur in Sidenreng Rappang Regency, where 
land acquisition by auction winners is held for 
two years permanently without any time with 
certain water depth conditions.
With the complex management dynamics, 
on the one hand, the local government gives 
access rights to the auction winner (Pallawang) 
to be controlled for a certain period of time, 
but on the other hand also gives concessions 
to the capture fisherman (Pakkajalalla) to access 
through the time and condition of the water’s 
depth. So, at the community level, there are 
mutual claims that have implications for the 
reality of relations between actors versus the 
legal rights and control of each actor.
Based on the observations involved, the 
author found at least two types of rules that 
apply at the Lake Tempe; namely, the formal 
rules and the informal rules. Both formal 
rules and informal rules are constructed to 
regulate, control, and manage the actors in 
the management of Lake Tempe. The formal 
rules are arranged formally and in writing 
from the government which is vertical. It is 
called vertical because the rule came from the 
government, which was applied, to residents 
in Lake Tempe. The sanction mechanism was 
stipulated in writing and officially carried 
out or enforced by the government officials, 
such as the Joint Lake Tempe Control Team 
(Police, Community Police Officer, Common 
Administration Officer, and Fisheries Main 
Station) to everyone who violates these rules.
Meanwhile, informal rules are rules that 
are regulated and agreed upon by citizens 
from generation to generation, relying on 
oral traditions, local customs, and horizontal 
characteristics. The sanctions mechanism is a 
social sanction that was regulated and agreed 
upon which is carried out by traditional elders 
called Macoa Tappareng (lake elders from men) 
and Pabbijagae (spokespersons and executors 
of ritual events from women).
From the two types of rules of the game 
that apply at Lake Tempe, there are differences 
in claims (contestation) of interests between 
actors in interpreting these rules, the level of 
compliance and submission of citizens and 
the implementation of existing sanctions 
mechanisms. For the Regional Government 
the formal rules of the game are fair enough to 
regulate the fishermen who use Lake Tempe; 
moreover, the process of determining it at 
the beginning of the preparation of Regional 
Regulations was carried out in a participatory 
manner involving NGOs, Universities and 
local Fishermen. However, for the captured 
fishermen (Pakkajalalla), the rules for playing 
with this open auction system only benefited 
a few people who had money to pay rent 
and actually violated the customary rules of 
permanently installing fishing gear (Mattang 
Poli ‘).
Rules that can be accessed when the 
water is above 1.45 meters or “assala”  “assala’ 
weddingngi mopi nola lopi yase’na belle’e makkajai 
campongnge” (as long as the boat can still pass 
above the attached splint catching gear can be 
accessed. This was based on the small fisherman; 
it is almost impossible to enforce because 
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the auction winner (Pallawang) is “tricky” by 
installing a connecting device over the splint, 
so that no boat can pass. Likewise, with rules 
that allow access by anyone when the water 
recedes to become Palawija farming area, which 
it is almost impossible to implement, because 
the auction winner (Pallawang) always argues 
that they are experiencing a loss.
For big fishermen (winner of the auction/
Pallawang), the rules that stipulate regular 
management time; namely, July - December 
for Soppeng Regency and May - December 
for Wajo Regency cause Pallawang fishermen 
to often suffer losses due to climate factors 
that often change. According to Pallawang 
fishermen, the rules should follow climate 
change because the capture fisheries system in 
Lake Tempe is actually based on tides.
Based on the results of several interviews, 
it was found that even when the auction rules 
were open, there were several factors. Thus, 
not all fishermen wanted and could take part in 
the auction, including the flow of information 
spread from the committee to all fishermen, 
fishermen’s proximity to the committee or 
local government, actor knowledge about the 
auction mechanism, experience participating 
in the auction. Therefore, generally, those who 
win an auction are village elites who have 
economic capital, have strong information on 
correlations with local government officials. 
While the captured fishermen (Pakkajalalla), 
even when they knew that the auction was 
open, anyone could follow it, but they did 
not know or did not want to know how to 
participate in the auction process; besides, 
lack of capital was the main reason. The only 
thing they can do is just to watch the auction 
at the Sub-district head’s Office and to wait for 
who wins one particular location. Captured 
fishermen (Pakkajalalla) are important to know 
who the auction winner is because it will later 
affect the workforce on the land. It can be seen 
who won the auction from year to year; it will 
appear that the name often appears and recurs 
as the winner.
The dynamics of other actor relations 
are how actors interpret formal rules, informal 
rules, and the mechanism of sanctions from 
each type of rule. As an example in the formal 
rules, it is prohibited to use fish stunner, tiger 
trawlers (Jabba ‘Trawls), trawls of (Jabba’ Bessi), 
net Tongkang and Bungka Toddo ‘ which size 
should only be 125 meters’ x 125 meters and 
Lanra’ (nets) that must be above 5 cm and a 
maximum length of 500 meters. However, in 
the field, there are many violations of fishing 
(illegal fishing), especially the use of prohibited 
fishing gear, a distance of Bungka Toddo’ and the 
size of the net that should be used.
From the results of the observations 
and interviews, it was found that there was a 
tendency for the fishermen to violate the formal 
rules due to economic urgency or the desire of 
the fishermen to get more catches. In addition, 
Lake Tempe fish stocks are increasingly limited 
along with the many fishermen who depend 
on this lake. The emergence of modern fishing 
gear such as Tongkang and Jabba Bessi ‘in the 
early 2000s replaced traditional tools such as 
Bubu’, spear, Konde,’ Julu’ and Salekko ‘and 
increased illegal fishing is known to contribute 
to increasing fisherman competition in getting 
results fish at the Lake Tempe.
Responding to the rampant illegal fishing, 
the regional governments in the 3 Regencies 
initiated the establishment of a Community 
Monitoring Group (Pokmaswas) in their area. 
This Pokmaswas serves to supervise and direct 
control of illegal fishing activities. The core 
management (Chairperson, Secretary, and 
Treasurer) is taken from the fishermen elements 
plus a joint team of fishermen elements, Head 
of Fisheries Main Station, Fisheries Extension, 
commander of the army administrative, head 
of district police, police officer, Prosecutors, 
and village chief/village. In its journey, the 
Pokmaswas was not functioning properly. 
Fishermen can “play cat and mouse” with 
patrol officers, if Wajo officers hunt fishermen 
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in Wajo, fishermen can run to Soppeng, which 
is no longer their territory. Even when found, 
the Chairperson of the Pokmaswas himself 
claims to use Jabba Bessi trawl, while showing 
the tool to the author at his home. According to 
him, this has to be used, if you don’t use it, what 
do you want to eat? As it’s hard to find fish. 
In addition, he also highlighted the Pallawang 
system, which was dominated by rich people 
and close to the local government officials.
In contrast to the formal rules, it seems 
that the informal rules are still abstinence to 
break by citizens. It is known that there are 
still many residents who abstain from fishing 
in sacred places, bring two fishing gear at 
once, catch fish on Friday nights and bring 
their wives to join in catching fish. After being 
asked further, commonly, they stated that 
they were afraid of getting social sanctions in 
the form of fines (Idosa). In addition, they also 
believe this action gives the opportunity to fish 
to rest and breed, so that later on the day, the 
income will be abundant. They also believe that 
when someone violates this custom, it will be 
discovered during the Maccera Tappareng event, 
where customary violators will be caught when 
Macoa Tappareng and Pabbijagae are possessed. 
At the time of the confusion, the fishermen’s 
violations will be revealed, the time is too late, 
there is a flag there, wrong intention, why 
should the goat, it should be buffalo, because 
this year’s results only get this much but why 
only cattle, all kinds of things, but that is 
surprising. However, these past years have 
always been buffaloes; I have heard that fewer 
people are possessed.
Although, the informal rules persist until 
now; however, according to some fishermen 
and community leaders that the informal rules 
have begun to erode, for example, the Maccera 
Tappareng event has been challenged by the 
Islamic groups, especially Muhammadiyah 
in Wajo because it was considered Mappadua 
(Godly or Shirk). In addition, there have been 
several changes in orientation. It used to be 
a ritual event, in which full of meaning and 
symbols began the work of fishermen and read 
natural signs, whether the work or income of 
fishermen in this season would be abundant 
or bad. – It is therefore always carried out at 
the beginning of the tide as the meaning of 
picking up water (Maddupa Uwwai). – Now, it 
is turned into a “local government protocol” 
event with the name “Tempe Lake Festival” 
followed by a boat race, not just the changing 
times, which usually adjust 17 August event, 
but also its orientation is more towards the 
tourism destination, and the executor of the 
program has also changed. Formerly, the 
dominants were traditional leaders and figures 
of fishing communities led by Macoa Tappareng, 
but now, more from the Department of Tourism 
and Culture in collaboration with the Fisheries 
Service.
Based on the results of these studies, 
it can be concluded that in determining the 
formal and informal regulatory framework, 
there are actors who have the most role and 
dominance. In the formal rules, it was found 
that the most important and dominating actors 
were state actors who were supported by the 
local business actors who obtained economic 
benefits from the regulation. The state actors 
have a high level of influence, and a high level 
of importance in determining the rules of the 
game and sanctions, but do not get strong 
legitimacy at the level of the community. While 
the informal rules that have the most role 
and dominant are traditional leaders (Macoa 
Tappareng) with a high level of importance 
and influence and gain the legitimacy and 
compliance of the local fishermen compared 
to their compliance with formal rules. In 
terms of urgency, both formal and informal 
rules are equally important to balance the 
social, economic, and environmental aspects of 
natural resource management at Lake Tempe. 
Although, there was no manifest conflict 
between Pallawang and Pakkajalalla because of 
the kinship ties between them and the existence 
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of customary rules and mutual dependence on 
the relations of workers and capital owners, as 
it gave rise to a subtle elite capture. Quoting 
Das Gupta, et al., 2004: 28 in Setiadi, et al. (2016) 
that elite capture is “serious power imbalances 
... the poor are heavily dependent on vertical links 
with local elites. [therefore] it is difficult to form the 
horizontal associations necessary for organizing 
collective action for the common good.” When 
collective action is co-opted by the interests of 
some of the elites, the elite will take advantage 
of it (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000 in Setiadi, 
et al. 2016). Elite capture is increasingly 
unstoppable when socio-cultural models of 
social relations prioritize harmony; avoid 
conflict, as well as there is no check and balance 
(Setiadi et al., 2016).
The Reality of the Structure of the Formed 
Social Network
The dynamics of relations between 
actors and the contestation of interests that 
take place between state actors, big fishermen 
(local entrepreneurs) and small fishermen 
as described earlier reflect a relationship of 
interests and asymmetrical power relations. 
This is in accordance with the basic principle 
of social networks that when an asymmetrical 
relationship occurs, where the resources among 
actors were distributed unevenly, it equitably 
forms an unequal social network structure. 
Bodin and Ernston (2006) emphasize that the 
typology of the structure of social networks was 
influenced by the dynamics of relationships 
and ties between actors that can be seen from 
the characteristics of the pattern and content 
of the relationship. The pattern and content of 
relationships is a process of social interaction 
that works, which can be detected through the 
process of transferring knowledge, sharing 
information, and building consensus among 
actors from relationships of interests and 
power.
From the dynamics of relations between 
actors in the management of Lake Tempe; at 
least, it was found three typologies of social 
network structures were formed, namely [1] 
network closeness or cohesiveness; [2] network 
centrality; and [3] network heterogeneity or 
Burt (2001) called as structural holes.
First, the density network, which is a 
network formed because the actors are directly 
connected. In the case of the management of 
Lake Tempe, there were clicks or groups of 
users of freshwater fisheries. In the open access 
area, there was a close relationship between 
small fishermen. Small fishermen are fishermen 
who use fishing gear that was installed to move 
in no more than one day or 1 night. Because 
the fishing gear moved around and was not 
installed permanently, they were referred to as 
Pakkajalalla (migratory fishermen) to find fish 
where according to knowledge, experience, 
and information from fellow fishermen it 
was possible to catch more fish. At the level 
of Pakkajalalla, it was found to click according 
to the fishing gear used and the time chosen 
to start searching for the fish. For example, 
Pakkajalalla uses a net fishing gear (Lanra) 
and both depart in the morning and returns 
home in the afternoon, they call it Pallanra 
Esso (fisherman nets during the day); a kind of 
fishing club that uses nets (Lanra) on daytime. 
The same thing happens to fishermen who use 
nets that leave in the afternoon and go home 
in the morning; they call themselves Pallanra 
Wenni (fishermen nets at night). Generally, they 
have a very strong network of closeness, both 
of those who meet on the lake from 3 regencies 
and (moreover) from the same village. They 
build a high level of kinship and cooperation 
in solving the problems faced. They also shared 
knowledge and access to resources at Lake 
Tempe, sharing of knowledge about places to 
catch more fish.
Pada Lao Te Pada Upe’ (the same goes 
not the same fortune) is a phrase often spoken 
from a capture fisherman in the waters of 
Lake Tempe when they saw other fishermen 
catching more fish. Although departing at the 
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same time, the same type of boat and fishing 
gear are the same, but sometimes the results 
(which are interpreted as fortune) are not 
the same. Different fortune does not make 
fishermen jealous, protest and fight. But on the 
other hand, fishermen can protest with various 
expressions: damaging fishing gear, taking fish 
and terrorizing other fishermen when there are 
fishermen or other parties who violate norms, 
control (Mangongko) a land and government 
policies that hinder and/or reduce their fortune, 
which according to them has become a right 
that has been mutually agreed upon.
When catches using nets start to decline, 
they usually give information to each other 
about what fishing gear can catch more fish. 
From this mutual information, this was the 
beginning of the emergence of banned modern 
fishing gear, such as iron wire nets (Jabba 
’Bessi’), tiger trawlers, Tongkang (bamboo-
shaped parabola made of bamboo or iron) and 
storage storms.
The closeness network can also be 
seen from the employer-labor relationship 
(patron-client) between small fishermen and 
local entrepreneurs (big fishermen) who win 
the auction of the local government-owned 
land with a profit-sharing system. Small 
fishers usually work in a double profession, 
one day, they become laborers during the 
harvest season in Pallawang and on the other 
day, they keep looking for fish in free areas as 
usual. Between the employer and the workers, 
there is intertwined with mutual trust. As an 
employer, it must be ensured that the profit 
sharing is according to the agreement, as a 
worker must ensure not to cheat and steal 
fish (Maceko-Ceko). In addition, close networks 
can also be seen from the relations between 
fellow local entrepreneurs (big fishermen). 
They usually give information to each other 
about auction times and requirements with 
the lowest number of bids. When the auction 
was held, they usually managed each other’s 
strategies, for example, H. Sau wanted to win 
a location, so they told their competitor, H. 
Ruse ‘that had to put lower bids below him, 
even when the difference was only 100,000 IDR 
vice versa. After being explored further, the 
common auction winner usually has a kinship 
and family network.
A network of closeness can also be seen 
between local government actors as auction 
implementers and local entrepreneurs. In some 
cases, the auction winner is the Bupati (officer 
in charge of regency) candidate’s success team 
and legislative members; so that later, the 
auction mechanism will become a medium of 
exchange.
This density is actually a bonding social 
capital between fishermen which can contribute 
to the strengthening trust between individuals 
and groups, thus increasing the possibility of 
social control over resource use (Granovetter, 
1985; Coleman et al., 2008; Pretty and Ward 
2001 in Bodin and Ernston (2006)). However, 
the closeness of the network has the potential 
to further erode the preservation of Lake 
Tempe’s natural resources when there is a 
homogenization of experience and knowledge. 
In order to obtain abundant fish locations and 
innovation in fishing equipment that is not 
environmentally friendly.
Second, network centrality occurs at the 
level of determining regulations, implementing 
rules for playing management, and allocating 
land dominated by state actors, in this case, 
the local governments in 3 Regencies. The 
position of the state occupies the center of 
the structure that was supported and utilized 
by the local entrepreneurs to influence the 
management decisions of Lake Tempe so 
that the decisions remain stable and provide 
benefits for themselves and their groups. State 
actors and local entrepreneurs are at the top of 
the centrality structure, while small fishermen 
are on the periphery network structure. This 
is because of this centrality network, the state 
benefits as a source of authority and profit 
for large fishermen (comprador) as a source 
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of economic income. Although, according to 
Bodin and Ernston (2006), centrality networks 
have advantages and disadvantages. On the 
one hand, it can create effective coordination 
of the actors and users of resources at the 
beginning of the decision-making process. 
However, on the other hand, the disadvantages 
are greater because it can lead to increasingly 
centralized decision making and reduce access 
to marginalized individual actors for various 
sources of information according to their 
aspirations and interests.
Third, the structural hole referred to in 
this study is the connection between various 
sub-groups that were structurally separated, 
such as in an organization or a particular sector. 
In the case of Lake Tempe management, it was 
found that at least four groups of actors that 
had the potential to become separate clicks; 
namely, state actors (3 regional governments), 
local entrepreneurs (big fishermen), small 
fishermen, and NGOs. The four categories 
of actors were ideally placed as key players 
who are expected to build cooperation, share 
power, responsibility, and collective action 
to solve social, economic, and environmental 
degradation problems in the core region of 
Lake Tempe Region as an integrated spatial 
unit. The potential fact has already formed with 
the fact that big fishermen (local entrepreneurs) 
have close relations between large fishermen 
across the Regency. Small fishermen have 
relationships and ties between small fishermen 
across Regencies. NGOs have been informed 
about the establishment of the Tempe Lake 
Rescue Forum across the Regency. Therefore, 
groups of fishermen fit their categories and 
NGOs have the potential to become one large 
group and have no problems in collaborating 
across Regions. It’s just that in the Regional 
Government actors found a structural hole 
between the 3 Regencies with no legal and law 
protection together to regulate the management 
of Lake Tempe.
The structural hole at the fishermen 
level actually occurs between large groups 
of fishermen and small groups of fishermen 
in terms of inequality of resources (interests, 
power, and economy) in accessing and 
controlling the Lake Tempe. Small fishers are 
a group that is cut off from access, which is 
always losing in competition for the benefits 
and benefits of natural resources at Lake 
Tempe, even when this structural hole is social 
capital that can be activated to bridge separate 
actors (individuals or groups) in facilitating 
collective management action.
For this reason, Bodin and Ernston (2006) 
proposed a broker as an actor who embodies 
“social bridging” from the community to 
bridge broken and losing groups. According 
to him, the advantage of being a broker is that 
it can access a lot of information from specific 
groups and then replicate it in different groups 
that allow brokers to synthesize knowledge 
of natural resources extensively. In addition, 
through structural positions, brokers learn 
about the inner life of many different groups 
and therefore, through their position, benefit 
from knowing which groups or individuals 
were connected or not connected, and how to 
connect them, (Burt 2001 in Bodin and Ernston 
2006).
However, the broker who is expected to 
connect between groups that get a lot of profits 
(Pallawang) and the losing group (Pakkajalalla) 
does not appear on Lake Tempe. Although, 
the potential exists as in H. Sau (Soppeng), H. 
Karding (Wajo), Usman Pangade (Wajo) and La 
Bure (Sidrap), “they are people who are close 
to the local government, and they are very 
close to the citizens and respected in their area. 
They also have an extensive network in the 
Lake Tempe Region and at traditional markets 
and places of sale for fish.” However, they are 
also trapped to pursue economic interests as 
much as possible as auction winners (local 
entrepreneurs) and often become a successful 
team of candidates and regional heads in the 
election and regional elections which make 
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them suffer from personal conflicts of interest.
The NGOs Lake Tempe Rescue Forum 
also has the potential to become a broker but 
has limited strategies for organizing small 
fishermen and limited data based on the 
livelihood conditions of small fishermen. It 
seems that NGOs were trapped using technical 
data from the local government to support 
the decision to pass the management and 
permissive auction mechanism for several lake 
revitalization projects.
Conclusion 
Based on the results of this study, it can be 
concluded that: First, the relationship between 
actors and contestation of interests that arise in 
the management of Lake Tempe (determination 
of rules, enforcement of rules and complaints 
of actors) show an asymmetrical relationship 
of interests and power. An asymmetrical 
relationship took place because the resources 
of each actor were distributed unevenly. State 
actors and local entrepreneurs (big fishermen) 
have a strong network and a high degree 
of influence in determining the rules and 
allocation of Lake Tempe resources. While 
small fishing actors have a high level of 
importance but a weak level of influence, the 
implication is that small fishermen complain 
about formal rules with the widespread use of 
illegal fishing and disturbances to the area of 
land that is auctioned by the local government. 
In this context, the legitimacy of the state is 
considered weak because it is unable to control 
illegal fishing. As a result, natural resource 
management at Lake Tempe continues to 
perpetuate “the tragedy of the common.”
Second, the structure of social networks 
that were formed from the asymmetrical 
relations of interests and power are networks of 
closeness, centralized networks, and structural 
hole: First, the network of closeness occurs 
between small fishermen at the community 
or community level with high kinship and 
cooperation in solving problems at the 
community level. There is the sharing of 
knowledge and access to resources at Lake 
Tempe. There is the sharing of knowledge 
about fishing gear that can produce more 
fish. Closeness also occurs between groups 
of large fishermen and small fishermen, so 
a patron-client relationship is formed. The 
network of closeness also occurs between big 
fishermen and state actors (local government) 
in maintaining the commercialization of ex 
ornament lands.
Second, network centrality occurs at the 
level of determining the management and 
distribution rules of land control, which are 
dominated by state actors or local governments 
in each region. The position of the state, which 
occupies the center of the structure, is supported 
and utilized by local entrepreneurs to influence 
the management decisions of Lake Tempe so 
that the decision remains stable and provides 
benefits for themselves and/or their groups that 
trigger elite capture on one side and the removal 
of small fishermen subtly on the other side. State 
actors and local entrepreneurs are at the top of the 
centrality structure, while small fishermen are on 
the periphery network structure.
Third, a structural hole appears in the 
form of clicks or groups, namely clicking the 
local government of each Regency, clicking 
on local entrepreneurs (big fishermen) and 
clicking on small fishermen. These clicks cannot 
be bridged for integrated management and are 
unable to realize joint management because 
each click fights for its interests. The function of 
the broker, which is expected to link structural 
gaps between strong groups and weak groups, 
does not appear on Lake Tempe. Although its 
potential is owned by the NGOs Tempe Rescue 
Forum, it has limited strategies for organizing 
small fishermen and limited data based on 
the livelihood conditions of small fishermen. 
It seems that NGO is trapped using technical 
data from the local government to support 
the decision to pass the management and 
permissive auction mechanism for several lake 
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revitalization projects.
Unfortunately, this study has limitations 
because it does not detect the role of villages that 
include the Lake Tempe area, which is located 
on the edge of Lake Tempe as a buffer zone. 
The extent to which buffer villages organize the 
empowerment of marginalized small fishermen 
from the access and control of Lake Tempe. It is 
considering that the village now has sufficient 
village authority and allocation funds in the 
community empowerment program and the 
administration of BUMDes (Village Private 
Business Agency) according to the mandate 
of Law Number 6 the Year 2014 concerning 
Villages.
Thus, the implications of the results 
of this study are in accordance with the 
context of common natural pool resource 
management, which finds the fact that 
there is domination of state actors and local 
entrepreneurs in management. State actors and 
local entrepreneurs have high power and high 
interests, while small fishermen and NGOs 
have a high level of interest, but have a level of 
powerless influence. Thus, the recommended 
approach is the empowerment of small 
fishermen and NGOs to balance the role and 
position of the state and local entrepreneurs. 
When balance and equality occurs, then state 
actors, local entrepreneurs, small fishermen and 
NGOs can make partnerships as key players in 
the joint management of common natural pool 
resources belonging to Lake Tempe.
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